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Though  to-date  the  European  Union  (EU)  has  played  the  most  significant 
leadership role in international negotiations to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, the emission-reducing performance of individual EU Member states 
has for many been less than stellar. Several EU15 Member states continue to 
raise  rather  than  lower  emissions.  Analysing  the  most  successful  policy 
instruments,  this  paper  argues  EU  policy  efforts  could  benefit  from  three 
important innovations. The following strategies – the adoption of an EU-wide 
FIT (feed-in tariff), an EU-wide carbon tax and more flexibility in the trading of 
carbon credits – could significantly improve emission reductions, their relative 
cost-efficiency and spread burden-sharing more evenly across technologies and 
Member states. This raises important questions, both about the effectiveness of 
EU and Kyoto-style commitments, as well as the EU Emission Trading Scheme 
(ETS). The commitment strategy, and in particular the EU ETS mechanism, have 
had the smallest impact on emission reductions. The proposed set of strategies 
could make a far greater contribution to future EU efforts and potentially lock in 
the impressive progress already made. Such a policy shift, if successful, would 
also greatly enhance the EU’s already significant credibility and bargaining 
power in international climate negotiations. 
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1. Introduction 
The EU Climate (and Energy) policy framework
84 is in need of urgent 
reform. Though EU policy contains important commitments to the  UNFCCC 
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and  Kyoto  processes  and  further  traps  emissions  in  the  vice  of  a  complex 
emission trading scheme (the EU ETS), to-date these two factors have ultimately 
had little to do with actual progress on emission reductions. And though progress 
for  the  EU27  as  a  whole  has  been  stellar—in  2009,  greenhouse  gas  (GHG) 
emissions were approximately 17.3% below 1990 levels (EEA, 2010)—the two 
most powerful explanatory factors are the economic and energy transformation 
in Central and Eastern Europe and the more recent economic recession. Most, 
though not all, of the EU15 Member states have made little or no progress on 
emission reductions. Since signing the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and despite a EU-
wide commitment to reduce emissions by 8% as of 2012 and 20% as of 2020, 
quite a number of Member states have failed to make any progress and several 
continue to raise emissions.  
International bargaining on emissions is tremendously important and the 
EU role highly important. For one, the EU has played an exceedingly important 
international  role  in  promoting  commitments  to  emission  reductions  and  in 
pursuing  the  path  of  climate  change  mitigation  and  adaptation.  For  another, 
without the current international and EU policy framework, things could clearly 
be much worse. As a result, Member states have introduced national-level policy 
frameworks  leading  to  avoided  emissions  and  reduced  energy  intensity.  Yet, 
movement toward the increased use of renewable energy sources is unevenly 
distributed across the EU Member states. And much of this progress is largely 
the result of national level policies that are relatively disconnected from the EU 
policy framework. In fact, the failure to promote or delegate more responsibility 
and authority to the EU level may mean that individual Member state efforts are 
at best uneven and at worst likely to lead to significant distortions in the EU 
marketplace. 
A few simple (though politically complicated) tweaks of the EU climate 
policy framework could potentially go a long way to resolving and improving 
overall EU policy efforts. Rather than relying so heavily on the KP commitment 
mechanism and in particular the EU ETS system, this article recommends the 
EU amend the principal focus of policy efforts to a power-switch type model 
focused  broadly  on  the  rapid  adoption  of  renewable  energy  sources  and 
technologies (RES) and the more intense inclusion of  end user-based energy 
efficiency strategies that raise the cost of fossil fuel use and provide stronger 
incentives  for rapid  new technology  adoption in  building-related  energy  use. 
Finally,  the  progress  made  in  reducing  emissions  in  particular  in  the  New 
Member states of Central and Eastern Europe should be locked in by policies 
promoting even more extensive improvements—potentially through the use of 
EU Structural and Cohesion funds. Without this, economic growth and the slow 
but progressive enrichment of Central and East European citizens will lead to 
progressive increases in fossil fuel consumption. 
Failure to adopt these changes may result in the limited efficacy of the EU 
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principal emphasis on emissions in the power sector and high-emitting firms and 
requires these firms to purchase the right to emit GHG’s at a price determined by 
the  carbon  market.  It  thus  raises  the  price  of  fossil  fuel-based  energy 
consumption,  effectively  introducing  a  carbon  price.  While  intended  to 
encourage a shift in the use of fossil fuels, this assumption is based on the logic 
that users have the ability to raise their efficiency or choose other fuel types. For 
coal-based electricity generation, for example, such choices are limited. While 
firms can elect to build new RES-based facilities and abandon older facilities, 
they  frequently  cannot  simply  switch  fuels  or  update  existing  technology. 
Similar  problems  arise  for  production  in  high-emitting  firms.  While  new 
production technologies may be around the corner, most industries have little 
playroom for promoting more efficient production.
85 Given this limited room for 
manoeuvre, the EU ETS system may target the wrong actors. Alternatively, the 
rapid adoption of new RES technologies or building -related energy use shows 
significant  potential.  Thus  a  policy  strategy  focused  on  encouraging  such 
approaches may provide far greater potential margins for success. 
In this sense, the EU commitment and EU ETS strategy should perhaps be 
downplayed vis-￠-vis alternative strategies. As this article demonstrates, there is 
considerable potential for making rapid progress on the basis of a power-shift 
type model, the more rapid adoption of RES technologies and a decisive end-
user strategy focused on the adoption of new technologies in building-related 
energy use. The EU ETS model may ultimately hamstring rapid action, since it 
places too much emphasis on the role of traditional industries (likely to favour 
slower depreciation of fixed capital and physical infrastructure and thus slower 
replacement  rates)
86  and  not  enough  emphasis  on  complementary  strategies 
geared toward rewarding the rapid adoption of new technologies, in particular by 
new and more flexible actors. 
Without reform, progress toward emission reductions in the EU is likely 
to  remain  at  best  uneven.  Moreover,  the  ability  of  some  countries  to  make 
decisive progress in overall emission reductions, in the rapid adoption of low 
carbon  and  energy  efficient  technologies  and  in  the  promotion  of  rapid 
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technology  innovation  and  development,  means  an  excessive  share  of  the 
emission reduction burden is borne by an uneven share of EU Member states. 
This  raises  the  potential  for  extensive  market  distortions  and  ultimately 
introduces a disruptive element in the European single market space. 
 
2. Current EU performance 
The EU’s current efforts at greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions 
are  primarily  focused  on the  power  sector  and  other  high-emitting  industrial 
installations.  This  project  essentially  has  three  components.  One  is  the 
requirement that the power sector and high-emitting industrial firms reduce their 
carbon  output  or  purchase  carbon  allowances  on  the  EU  emission  trading 
scheme  (EU  ETS)  market.  The  second  is  that  countries  make  an  effort  to 
increase their use of renewable energy sources (RES) to a negotiated share of 
total energy use by 2020. Finally, the EU also requires Members states to reduce 
energy  use  by  20%  by  2020  and  to  increase  energy  efficiency.  The  Energy 
Efficiency Directive, a revised version of which is currently under negotiation, 
encourages Member states to raise their energy efficiency by approximately 20% 
by the year 2020. Thus, although EU MS are not moving rapidly on this front, 
much of the 20% reduction in energy use could potentially be made through 
raising energy efficiency. 
In many ways, the EU is already well positioned to meet its 2020 target of 
reducing GHG emissions by 20% from 1990 levels. In 2009, one year into the 
first commitment period (2008-2012) specified in the Kyoto Protocol (KP) and 
still far from the second commitment period (2013-2020) specified by the EU’s 
2020  Energy  and  Climate  Package,  EU-27  emission  reductions  were  17.3% 
below  1990  levels  (EEA,  2010,  p.6,  30).  Partly  in  order  to  maintain  this 
momentum, discussions in fact revolved around whether the EU emission target 
should be unilaterally raised to 30%,
87 as previously discussed in the context of 
an international Kyoto-II-type agreement. In this discussion, however, the two 
principal explanations for successful EU-level emission reductions – 1) the role 
of economic change and concerted action in the former communist countries, 
now  the  New  EU  Member  states,  and  2)  the  economic  crisis  –  are  quickly 
forgotten.  In  fact,  and  though  a  few  select  states  have  achieved  significant 
progress, little progress can be attributed to the positive actions of the EU and its 
Old Member states. 
As illustrated in Table 1, the Central and East European New Member 
states  have  made  the  principal  contribution  to  EU27  emission  reductions. 
Moreover, this is true whether one considers 1990 the effective base year, or 
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1997, the year in which the Kyoto Protocol was finally signed (at which point 
countries were aware what their “effective” targets would be). Though a large 
share of the total EU27 emission reductions occurred in the Central and East 
European Member states prior to the signing of the Protocol (in 1997), emission 
reductions continue to be made well after that date. In fact, post-1997 the largest 
share  of  emission  reductions  is  still  contributed  by  the  NMSs.  The  positive 
performance  of  the  Central  and  East  European  states  is  marred  only  by  the 
negative performance of Slovenia. In this last country, emissions have grown by 
a significant amount, both before and after 1997. 
Finally, though the relative performance of the Central and East European 
states is in part explained by the adoption of low emission reduction targets 
(lower  targets  translate  into  higher  performance),  the  New  Member  states 
adopted remarkably strict targets compared to some of the former “cohesion” 
Member  states (those  Western  EU15  Member  states  previously  the  principal 
recipients of EU Structural and Cohesion funding—in particular Spain, Portugal, 
Greece and Ireland) and countries like Cyprus and Malta (who recently adopted 
formal  targets  similar  to  those  of  the  cohesion  countries).  While  the  former 
cohesion countries were permitted to raise emissions under the KP framework, 
the  Central  and  East  European  Member  states—despite  considerably  lower 
levels of economic development—were all required to adopt emission reduction 
targets between 6% and 8%.
88 
   Though the performance illustrated in Table  1 the standard approach for 
representing  progress  on  emission  reductions,  little  about  how  individual 
Member states have performed relative to each other and to economic and 
financial  constraints  is  revealed.  This  analysis  adopts  two  strategies  for 
standardizing and comparing individual Member state performance based on two 
key factors: population- and income-weighted measures of individual Member 
state contributions to emission reductions. These weights are chosen because 
they  represent  the  most  relevant  determinants  of  “equitably”  based  burden-
sharing – emission reduction shares based on per capita emissions and relative 
wealth. 
  The EEA is responsible for collecting the EU GHG emission data used for 
UNFCCC reporting. In order to assess the relative contribution of EU Members 
states to GHG emission reductions, this data is analyzed comparing 2008 levels 
to 1990. For the analysis herein, 2008 GHG emissions are subtracted from 1990 
levels and this number is divided by the total EU27 contribution to emission 
reductions. This  relative  share of emission  reductions  is  then  divided by  the 
individual Member state’s relative share in EU27 population and income (GDP). 
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The  corresponding  output  provides  two  numbers  that  express  the  number  of 
times  an  individual  Member  state  has  surpassed  (or  undershot)  its  expected 
performance based on its relative share of the EU population, or relative income 
(GDP). Since countries that have increased (not  reduced) their emissions are 
represented  by  negative  contributions,  results  are  also  expressed  as  negative 
numbers in the output data, thus indicating movement in the opposite direction. 
Finally, since Cyprus and Malta have recently adopted Kyoto targets, they have 
also been included in the analysis. 
Table 1. EU member state performance on Kyoto Protocol  (2008 / 1990 and 
2008 / 1997) 
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat/EEA online data. 
 
Interpreting these results is straightforward. Both population and income-
weighted contributions of individual EU Member states yield an output of “1” if 
countries have reduced emissions by as much as one would expect given their 
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the  EU  population  might  be  expected  to  contribute  12%  to  the  total  GHG 
emission reductions, yielding a value of “1”. Between 0 and 1, countries are 
making progress but have thus far not managed to reduce their emissions by as 
much  as  one  would  expect  given  their  relative  population/income  share. 
Numbers greater than “1” suggest that individual Member states have surpassed 
what  one  would  expect.  Negative  numbers  indicate  that  Member  states  are 
increasing  emissions  rather  than  reducing  them.  Further,  there  should  be  no 
expectation that countries will perform the same on both population and income-
weighted measures. In fact, significantly less developed countries may perform 
poorly  with  respect  to  population  shares,  but  significantly  better  based  on 
relative income. 
Countries not achieving what one would expect based on their relative 
population or income shares still have the opportunity to do this given that the 
first  Commitment  Period  (CP1)  runs  from  2008-2012.  In  addition,  these 
numbers do not encompass emission reductions for 2009, the year most strongly 
affected by the recent economic crisis, or the remaining years in CP1. Further 
drops in emissions have likely resulted in some countries, in particular those 
hardest hit by the recession. However, including 2009 data could be misleading 
since it is unlikely the levels recently achieved will be maintained. 
Weighted on the basis of population shares, the Central and East European 
New Member states all represent the forerunners in the EU effort to reduce GHG 
emissions (Figure 1). Estonia, for example has delivered an effort 12 times what 
it should have contributed based on its relative share in EU population. Cyprus, 
on the other hand, lies at the opposite end of the circle. To-date, Cyprus has 
raised GHG emissions fully 5.1 times the amount it should have reduced them 
based on its relative population shares. Similarly, Ireland has raised emissions 
approximately 2.3 times the amount it should have reduced them. Similar results 
are found for  Greece  (1.7  times),  Portugal (1.4 times),  Slovenia (1.1 times), 
Austria (0.8 times) and Italy (0.3 times). Only a select set of old EU Member 
states have managed to reduce emissions beyond what one would expect based 
on their EU population shares (Germany,
89 the UK, and Luxembourg). Several 
other countries have at least made progress in reducing emissions, though for the 
most part they remain below what one would expect based on their relative 
population shares (Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, France and 
Finland). Among the Central and East European states, Slovenia stands out as 
the only country to move in the wrong direction, away from its Kyoto target. 
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Figure  1.  Population  -  weighted  contribution  (total  emission  reductions, 
2008/1990) 
 
Sources: own calculations based on data from EEA (2010) and Eurostat online 
population data.  
 
Analysis  based  on  each  Member  state’s  relative  share  of  EU  income 
(GDP)  yields  similar  results  (Figure  2).  Though  the  ordering  of  countries 
changes, the basic principle remains the same. Based on their relative wealth in 
the  EU,  the  New  Member  states  have  again  contributed  far  more  to  Kyoto 
emission  reductions  than  one  would  expect.  Bulgaria  tops  this  list,  having 
contributed 29.1 times what it should have contributed based on relative wealth. 
This time the contrast in relative effort is starker than before, suggesting an 
effort that is even (29.1/4.5 = 6.5) 6.5 times greater than what one would expect 
based on relative EU population shares.  
On the other end, Cyprus again remains near the top of the list of poor 
performers, having increased its emissions by 5.9 times more than it should have 
reduced them based on its relative share of EU wealth. And this time both Malta 
and Cyprus remain at the bottom of the pack. Further, many EU15 Member 
states are in a similar position (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Austria and the 
Netherlands). This time, only two EU15 Member states have contributed more to 
emission reductions than one would expect based on relative wealth (Germany 
and the UK). Since first commitment period ends only in 2012, several countries 
have at least made progress in the right direction (Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, 
France,  and  Finland).  Slovenia  again  remains  the  lone  exception  among  the 
Central  and  East  European  New  Member  states,  having  raised  emissions 
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Figure 2. Income - weighted contribution (total emission reductions, 2008 / 
1990) 
 
Sources: own calculations based on data from EEA (2010) and Eurostat online 
GDP data. 
 
This  second  set  of  findings  is  particularly  important  in  the  context  of 
arguments  that  wealthier  states  should  bear  a  larger  share  of  the  burden  of 
reducing emissions. This basic principle is well integrated and enshrined into 
thinking under the UNFCCC and IPCC frameworks, as well as the EU policy 
context. In all three of these contexts, less wealthy states are generally granted a 
framework  that  allows  them  to  continue  to  grow  economically  without 
significantly challenging them on emission reductions (as reflected, for example, 
in the emission reduction targets of the former EU cohesion countries, Malta and 
Cyprus).  
The  EEA  has  illustrated  that  the  second  largest  contributor  to  EU27 
emission reductions is the economic recession (EAA, 2010, Figure 4.1., p. 31). 
Moreover, given the fact that the Central and East European states were typically 
more immediately and dramatically affected by the recession, one should expect 
emission reductions to again be significantly greater in the New Member states. 
This point is substantiated by the most recent EEA GHG inventory submission 
to the UNFCCC. Based on this data, the NMS reduced emissions by 10.3% in 
2009,  while  the  EU15  only  witnessed  emission  reductions  of  6.2%
90.  As 
suggested by the EEA projections for future emissions, the EEA does not expect 
this decline in emissions to l ast. In February 2011, there were in fact already 
signs EU27 emissions were again on the rise.
91 And, a joint report from the PBL 
                                                 
90 These numbers are calculated on the basis of data in Table ES.3 (EEA, 2011, vii). 
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Netherlands  Environmental  Assessment  Agency  and  the  European 
Commission’s  JRC  noted  that  EU27  emissions  rose  3%  in  2010  (PBL-JRC, 
2011, p.11). 
These findings raise important questions about the future. A very large 
share of emission reductions in the EU27 results from the role played by the 
Eastern  Enlargement.  Without  this,  the  EU  would  not  easily  illustrate  that 
emission  reductions  can  be  achieved  and  pursued  in  a  collective  framework 
(such as the EU or the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol). In fact, few EU15 Member 
states are able to demonstrate emission reductions are possible while at the same 
time pursuing economic growth. Despite exceptions—the UK, Sweden, (perhaps 
Germany), and France (based on relative income shares)—most of the EU15 
Member  states  have  been  unable  to  make  significant  progress  on  reducing 
emissions  without  significant  reductions  in  economic  growth  (the  economic 
recession)  or  the  opportunity  to  make  use  of  the  various  UNFCCC  flexible 
mechanisms (i.e. the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation) 
(EEA,  2010).  Despite  the  declared  goal  of  achieving  an  8%  reduction  in 
emissions by 2012 and 20% by 2020, many individual MS remain quite far from 
achieving even the first of their EU-level burden-sharing commitments. Actual 
performance is worse in some cases.  
 
3. EU vs. national-level policy effectiveness? 
As suggested above, the most efficient and effective emission reducing 
tools to-date have been the Eastern Enlargement and economic change in the 
Central  and  East  European  Member  states  and  the  economic  recession. 
However, other factors also contribute to important progress toward emission 
reductions in individual Member states. In what follows, the rate of adoption of 
new renewable technologies in individual EU Member states is analyzed based 
on  the  same  basic  logic  as  above.  The  relative  “effort”  or  performance  of 
individual member states is measured against what one might expect based on 
relative EU population shares and/or wealth, using data for the period 1990-
2009.  
Population-weighted analyses of the rapid adoption of renewable energy 
technologies  across  the  various  EU27  Member  states  suggest  two  important 
observations. First, a number of individual EU15 Member states are frequently 
the  most  important  contributors  to  the  rapid  adoption  of  certain  types  of 
renewable energy technologies. Thus, when looking at wind power, Denmark, 
Spain,  Portugal,  Germany,  Ireland  and  Sweden  are  far  and  away  the  most 
successful promoters adopting significantly larger shares of wind power relative 
to their share of the EU population. Denmark in particular has adopted 4 times 
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what one might expect given its relative EU population share. Sweden on the 
other hand, at 1.4 times, is close to what one might expect.  
 
[See Figures 3 - 8 from the annex] 
 
Second, the rapid adoption of renewable energy sources frequently occurs 
in  countries  one  might  not  expect  given  natural  endowments  of  wind,  solar 
radiation and/or the availability of biomass. Thus for example, while Spain is far 
and away the most prominent adopter of solar photovoltaic (PV) power cells on 
the basis of population share, Germany and Luxembourg are in second and third 
place, well ahead of Italy, Greece, Portugal and other southern countries with 
significantly larger natural endowments of solar radiation. Thus, national level 
strategies for the rapid adoption of renewable technologies presumably play a 
significant role in explaining at least some of the cross-country variation in EU 
Member state RES adoption.  
Similar claims can be made about the adoption of other RES technologies. 
For example, while the availability of wind power is significantly greater in 
countries like the  UK, performance  on the  adoption  of  wind power  pales  in 
comparison to other countries like Germany. With regard to solar thermal energy 
generation, while some of the countries at the top of the scale like Cyprus and 
Greece may not surprise, other countries like Austria (in second place) is entirely 
unexpected. Here again, national-level strategies plays an important role. 
Analyzing the data in the context of relative income likewise provides 
some  interesting  observations,  particularly  with  regard  to  more  conventional 
claims that the high cost of renewable energy represents a barrier for the less 
advanced economies or that incentives are not likely to be useful in countries 
where there is little available capital. Taking wind power as the first example 
(Figures 3 a, b), Portugal now tops the scale of rapid adoption based on its 
relative share of EU income. And Bulgaria now takes 4
th place (at 1.9 times), 
Estonia 6
th place (at 1.6 times), and Lithuania 9
th place at 0.9 times what one 
would  expect  based  on  relative  income.  For  Solar  PV  (see  Figures  5  a,  b), 
though  no  NMS  has  adopted  more  than  one  might  expect  based  on  relative 
income, the Czech Republic places surprisingly high, especially relative to the 
quite  large  number  of  other  EU15  Member  states  with  significantly  higher 
amounts  of  solar  radiation  that  place  considerably  lower  on  the  scale  (e.g. 
Portugal and Italy). Similar claims can likewise be made regarding solar thermal 
adoption (Figures 6 a, b) and Malta, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and 
Slovakia. 
Thus national level policies play an important role in contexts where the 
natural  advantages  of  individual  technologies  alone  (as  in  the  case  of  solar 
thermal in countries like Cyprus and Greece, and countless other examples) do 
not  immediately  encourage  rapid  adoption.  This  basic  analysis  further 
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important barrier to the rapid adoption of renewable energy technologies, this 
obstacle  can  be  overcome  with  inventive  strategies.  Moreover,  the  selective 
redistribution of resources to less advanced countries would presumably have 
further  beneficial  impacts  on  the  rapid  adoption  of  renewable  energy 
technologies. 
The adoption of biomass-based renewable energy technologies (district-
heating, electricity generation, combined heat and power as well as individual 
household use) provides an additional important example (Figures 4 a, b). Based 
on  population-weighted  measures,  the  use  of  biomass  in  primary  energy 
production is far and away the highest in Finland, Sweden, Estonia and Austria. 
Finland  hosts  8  times  and  Sweden  6.2  times  more  biomass-based  energy 
production than expected based on their share of EU population and Estonia 
hosts 3.4 times more.  
Based on income-weighted measures, however, the positions of individual 
countries change significantly: Latvia jumps to first place (at 11.8 times what 





th  respectively.  Only  Finland remains in the  top  5, in  third  place  (at 6 
times). This significant change in the relative positions of individual countries is 
presumably  related  to  two  factors:  the relative  cost of  biomass-based  energy 
resources  (more  competitive  than  other  available  RES  technologies)  and  the 
relative  availability  of  biomass  material  in  some  (though  not  all)  of  these 
countries. A varied mix of relative cost and resource abundance also presumably 
explains  the  relative  positions  of  Malta,  Slovenia,  the  Czech  Republic  and 
Slovakia with regard to solar thermal adoption. 
Looking at the share of total renewable energy sources in primary energy 
production (Figures 7 a, b) across the EU27 (because of limitations with regard 
to new capacity, hydropower is excluded from these numbers), a number of the 
EU15 Member states rank quite high based on relative population shares (in 
particular  Sweden,  Finland  and  Austria).  Only  a  few  New  Member  states 
produce  more  primary  energy  than  one  would  expect  based  on  relative 
population shares (Latvia, Slovenia and Estonia). However, based on relative 
income  shares,  a  significantly  large  share  of  NMS  comes  out  on  top  (in 
particular Latvia and Estonia, followed by Finland, Romania, Sweden, Bulgaria 
and Lithuania). The same analysis can be performed on the basis of the RES 
share in gross inland consumption (Fig. VIII, a, b). The basic findings do not 
really change. In particular, based on relative income shares, the same set of 
NMS comes out on top. Moreover, and more importantly perhaps, not a single 
NMS  (including  Slovenia)  produces  or  consumes  less  RES  energy  than  one 
would expect based on relative income shares. However, the same cannot be 
said for the majority of old EU Member states. Fully 9 out of 15 old EU Member 
states both produce and consume less RES energy than one would expect based 
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These  numbers  are  surprising  given  the  conventional  impression  of 
lagging performance in the New Member states. To raise the level of irony a 
notch,  back  in  2008,  it  was  once  recommended  that  the  Central  and  East 
European  New  Member  states  postpone  investment  in  renewable  energy 
resources  until  the  technologies  had  become  more  mature  and  prices  had 
declined.  However,  as  clearly  illustrated  in  Table  2,  the  Central  and  East 
European  New  Member  states  have  witnessed  the  highest  rate  of  growth  of 
renewable energy technologies. Though of course these countries have started 
from  a  somewhat  lower  level  of  renewable  energy  development,  the  use  of 
renewable energy technologies rose 185% between 1990 and 2009, compared to 
only 126% in the Old EU member states (see Table 2). 
Table 2.  Change in renewable and bio-energy use, 2009 / 1990 
 
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat online data.  
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At the same time, in the NMS, a relatively large share of this gross inland 
consumption is from biomass resources, 95% for Estonia, 86% for Lithuania, 
80% for Latvia, 77% for Hungary and 71% for Romania. While Latvia, Estonia 
and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  Lithuania  have  a  relatively  extensive  forest  cover, 
Romania has significantly fewer available forest resources (MCPFE 2007: pp. 6, 
8). Moreover, the use of biomass resources in Central and Eastern Europe has 
experienced quite rapid rates of growth. As a share of primary energy production 
(figures for Gross Inland Consumption are also included in Table 2), between 
1990  and  2008  the  use  of  biomass  has  grown  some  174%  in  the  ten  New 
Member  states  compared  to  only  68%  in  the  EU15.  Though  these  numbers 
disguise some important outliers—e.g. biomass use in the UK has grown by 
447%, in Italy by 376% and in Germany by 281% between 1990 and 2009—
over  the  same  period  biomass  use  has  grown  most  significantly  in  Romania 
(522%), Bulgaria (329%), Slovakia (272%), Estonia (270%), Poland (258%), 
Lithuania  (167%)  and  Hungary  (128%).  Whether  this  represents  a  threat  to 
available resources and the imperative of sustainable forest management remains 
to be seen. 
The above data overwhelmingly illustrate two important points. First, the 
adoption of RES technologies is extremely uneven across EU Member states. 
Moreover,  as  noted  above,  variation  in  the  rate  of  adoption  of  renewable 
technologies is not solely influenced by relative national endowments. This in 
turn suggests that national level strategies for promoting the rapid adoption of 
renewable  technologies  vary  significantly  in  relative  effectiveness  across 
Member  states.  Second,  relative  income  appears  to  play  a  strong  role  in 
determining  what  kind  of  renewable  technologies  are  adopted.  The  New 
Member states favour less costly renewable energy technologies, in particular 
woody biomass. However, as illustrated above, some of the NMS have begun 
adopting significant amounts of wind or solar PV. Thus, apart from some natural 
locational  advantages,  national-level  incentive  systems  presumably  play  an 
important role. 
Thus  strategies  that  encourage  the  adoption  of  a  broader  range  of 
renewable energy  technologies  across the  broad  range  of  EU  Member  states 
seem desirable. Moreover, the relative advantages arising from the promotion of 
technology  innovation  and  development  across  a  broad  set  of  technologies 
should be self-evident. 
 
4. A more effective Toolkit? Refining EU climate change mitigation tools 
Much  could  be  done  to  speed  up  progress  on  the  climate  mitigation 
agenda  and  simultaneously  to  speed  greater  innovation  and  dissemination  of 
renewable energy technologies in the EU. Though the EU and the MS have 
committed to significant emission and energy use reduction goals, the tools put 
into place to achieve those goals have the unintended consequence of reducing 
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The reasons for this are straightforward. First, as illustrated above, beyond 
the Eastern Enlargement and the economic recession, most of the major progress 
is related to policy strategies that are not the direct result of EU policy efforts 
but instead are primarily related to national-level policy strategies and efforts. 
Second,  the  emission  reduction  potential  in  sectors  outside  the  EU  ETS  is 
substantial, in particular in the areas of reducing building-related energy use, 
transport and LULUCF. Yet these sectors are typically not well mobilized in the 
EU Energy and Climate Package. Third, the EU climate strategy remains heavily 
compartmentalized. Countries have obligations in each of several categories: the 
EU ETS, the adoption of RES technologies, increasing energy efficiency and the 
reduction of energy use. The consequence is that individual Member states can 
ostensibly exceed their RES targets and reduce their emissions to well over the 
current 20% goal required by the EU Energy and Climate package for 2020, but 
still be required to meet EU ETS targets. Such a model is both awkward and 
inefficient. 
A more successful EU strategy should first find ways of building upon the 
more  successful  RES technology  adoption  strategies  introduced in individual 
Member states, second find ways of mobilizing the potential both in other non-
ETS sector activities and across ETS and non-ETS sectors, and third develop 
mechanisms for linking each of these different areas in a more flexible carbon 
trading framework in order to mobilize trade in particular across ETS and non-
ETS  sectors.  The  current  EU  climate  policy  framework,  the  EU  ETS,  RES 
technology adoption targets and EU energy efficiency guidelines may encourage 
continued  efforts  on  the  part  of  individual  MS,  the  power  sector  and  high-
emitting  firms.  However,  the  introduction  of  more  effective  tools  could 
potentially push MS to go much further.  
While the economic  recession  has  affected  all  MS,  its  transient  nature 
means  its  effects  will  not  be  long-lived  and  significant  reversals  will  result. 
Further, though much of the experience of the NMS cannot be repeated, locking-
in some of this progress as quickly as possible and building upon it would be 
advantageous. FIT systems, as well as the carbon tax model treated in more 
detail below, though unevenly applied across MS, can in fact be transferred to 
other  EU  MS  and  to  the  EU-level  as  whole.  Strategies  to  link  trading 
mechanisms  across  the  different  emission  reduction  systems  would  likewise 
permit greater flexibility in the strategies chosen by individual Member states 
and  presumably  raise  the  overall  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  emission 
reductions.  Thus,  to  improve  overall  cost-efficiency,  rapidity  and  relative 
burden-sharing in emission reductions, these three modifications of current EU 
strategy should be given greater consideration.  
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4.1. FIT systems 
Considerable variation in both the strategies adopted at the national-level, 
as well as performance across the EU MS, speaks in favour of the promotion of 
revised tools for the rapid adoption of renewable energy technologies. Typically, 
feed-in tariff (FIT) systems that pay producers higher fixed tariffs for energy 
produced  with  RES  technologies  have  most  efficiently  encouraged  rapid 
adoption.  Germany  and  now  Spain  and  Portugal  provide  representative 
examples.  In  general,  countries  that  have  introduced  “differentiated”  FIT 
systems have been able to promote high rates of RES technology adoption at a 
relatively reduced cost (Altmann et al., 2010a). Moreover, such strategies appear 
to have knock-on effects on the rate of technological innovation. The rate of 
RES  technology  adoption  has  triggered  considerable  growth  in  the  RES 
technology market, widespread competition across a large number of producers, 
lower prices and improved technological potential.  
To-date, the EU has done little to intervene in national-level MS RES 
promotion  strategies  other  than  to  set  very  broad  targets  on  the  adoption  of 
renewable energy and to promote what is called the Green guarantee of origin 
system. The new Green guarantee of origin system was introduced at the EU 
level along with the second Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC)
92 and is 
essentially intended to promote trade in renewable energy credits across Member 
states. However, it is not likely to have a significantly advantageous impact on 
RES technology adoption. The principal reason is its failure to provide a 
framework for the differentiated promotion of renewable energy sources. The 
Green guarantee of origin strategy (Art. 15) grants one green certificate for one 
MWh of RES energy produced, irrespective of technology type. This approach, 
closely  modeled  on  the  Renewable  Obligation  strategy  employed  in  some 
Member states (e.g. the UK) has done little to promote  the rapid adoption of 
renewable energy and has typically proven to be more expensive as a strategy. 
Moreover,  like  the  Green  guarantee  of  origin  model,  it  is  insensitive  to 
differences in technology. FIT systems, on the other hand, can offer different 
tariff rates for different technologies, thus making it possible to adjust for the 
varied cost of different renewable energy technologies. Since the EU level 
strategy rewards one MWh of effort with one MWh of credit, it is likely to 
encourage the large-scale use of wind energy technologies and biomass at the 
expense of other renewable energy sources.  
This has several disadvantages. Not all EU Member states enjoy large 
wind energy or biomass potential. And it remains exceedingly difficult to 
determine which renewable energy technologies will ultimately provide the best 
and cheapest future alternatives. Though some technologies remain expensive 
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(e.g.  Solar  PV),  different  renewable  technologies  have  different  advantages. 
Solar PV is perhaps one of the best potential strategies for reducing distances 
between  points  of production  and  consumption.  On  the  other  hand, it is  not 
necessarily  suitable  in  all  locations  (southern  locations  have  better  solar 
radiation than northern locations) and to-date it remains one of the more costly 
sources of renewable energy generation (though prices are falling fast). Wind 
power  may  thus  represent  a  more  favourable  option  for  many  locations,  in 
particular  where  the  amount  of  solar  radiation  is  lower  and  where  other 
renewable energy sources are not readily available. On the other hand, wind 
power typically requires large turbines that cannot easily be placed in densely 
populated residential areas. And the sheer number of wind turbines required to 
adequately meet all energy needs tends to make them unsightly.  
An additional problem is related to the intermittency of many renewable 
energy sources (in particular the fluctuation of solar and wind power over time), 
the challenge of maintaining a continuous and secure supply of energy on the 
grid  and  the  technological  problems  related  to  building  adequate  storage 
potential. Though more suitable storage technologies as well as more highly 
developed  Smart  Grid  networks  are  now  the  cutting  edge  of  technology 
development,  non-differentiated  strategies  for  the  promotion  of  RES 
technologies fail to address this specific problem. In contrast to the intermittent 
character  of  wind  and  solar  power,  biomass  combined  heat  and  power, 
geothermal energy resources, ocean-based power sources and hydropower all 
provide  constant  base  load  power.  Moreover,  given  favourable  locational 
variables (adequate biomass resources or favourable geological resources), both 
geothermal  and  biomass-based  energy  resources  are  increasingly  competitive 
(UCS,  2009,  Ch.5).  In  the  Scandinavian  countries,  biomass  has  become  the 
energy source of choice for smaller scale combined heat and power generation. 
FIT systems can be more effectively tailored to suit varying needs and even to 
drive the introduction of new alternatives, such as storage technologies. 
The current EU strategy is further unlikely to adequately adjust for the 
tremendously uneven character of support for renewable energy sources across 
the  individual  Member  states.  As  suggested  by  the  graphical  representations 
presented above, a select set of individual Member states bear an unusually high 
share of the research and development costs associated with the promotion of 
renewable energy resources. Countries like Germany, Denmark, Spain, Portugal 
and even Bulgaria ultimately (though sometimes indirectly) fund R&D costs for 
Wind or Solar PV to the benefit of the remaining EU Member states. For the 
reasons  discussed  above,  the  non-differentiated  character  of  the  EU  green 
guarantee of origin strategy will do little to resolve this problem. This general 
strategy of national-level promotion is not only inefficient. It is unlikely to bring 
the adequate critical mass to bear in order to bring about a successful and rapid 
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An  EU-wide  FIT  system,  on  the  other  hand,  would  go  a  long  way  to 
resolving  these  issues.  It  would  enable  a  technology  sensitive  system  for 
promoting both the development and the adoption of renewable energy resources 
across the EU as a whole. And in doing so, it would allow for the more rapid 
diffusion  of  renewable  energy  resources  across  a  wider  geographic  space. 
Finally,  such  a  system  would  be  likely  to  promote  more  rapid  technology 
innovation and thus successfully integrate the low carbon economy in European 
space. 
Finally,  much  can  be  said  about  the  benefits  of  FIT  programs  for 
reinforcing  market  mechanisms  and  driving  technological  innovation  and 
development.  FIT  programs  play  a  fundamental  role  in  driving  both  the 
commercialization  of  new  renewable  technologies  as  well  as  their  rate  of 
adoption. Moreover, because of the way such programs are structured, they are 
likely to have a remarkably favorable impact on market forces. FIT tariffs are 
essentially paid to investor-generators, individuals all the way from small-scale 
households  up  to  large-scale  wind  and  solar  farms  who  invest  in  these 
technologies for the purposes of power generation. Such investor-generators face 
strong market incentives to favor the most cost-efficient and potentially reliable 
renewable technologies available on the market, since these are likely to bring 
the  best  returns  from  FIT  systems.  Renewable  technology  producers,  on  the 
other hand, face strong market pressures to come up with the most cost-efficient 
technologies so that investor-generators will purchase them.  
Though the pricing of FIT systems has occasionally caused headaches for 
individual  countries  (witness  e.g.  the  recent  case  of  Spain),  their  effective 
implementation  provides  powerful  incentives  for  the  rapid  adoption  of  new 
technologies,  as  well  as  for  rapid  innovation,  development  and  the 
commercialization of new technologies. Moreover, the hidden costs of auction-
based strategies such as the UK model larger initial investments in order to file 
appropriate bids and waste significant resources when these fail. Such strategies 
not only artificially raise costs, they likewise inefficiently push most small-scale 
(e.g. household or even SME) producers out of the market.
93 Thus FIT systems, 
if appropriately structured, can encourage the development of highly competitive 
technology innovation markets. The withdrawal of support mechanisms, on the 
other  hand,  not  only  stymies  adoption  rates,  it  drastically  slows  rates  of 
investment, innovation and market development.  
 
4.2. Carbon taxes 
The EU ETS system, with its focus on the power sector and high-emitting 
industry, almost entirely misses the potential contribution to emission reductions 
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stemming from improvements in building-related energy use and/or reductions 
in natural gas use. At best curious in the current framework of energy security 
discussions  (like  oil,  the  adequate  provisioning  of  natural  gas  is  a  highly 
sensitive energy security concern), strategies should be found to broaden the 
scope and application of the EU Energy and Climate Package to a much broader 
segment of emission sources and fuel types. A carbon tax is presumably the 
ideal tool with which to achieve this goal since it can easily be made to apply to 
a broad range of fossil fuels—including natural gas—and it can easily be applied 
to a far wider range of emission sources (not just the power sector and high-
emitting firms).  
Oddly, carbon taxes have been significantly less well researched than most 
of the other tools currently used in the EU toolkit. The reasons for this are a bit 
obscure.  Many  of  the  major  organizations  (mostly  research  institutes  and 
NGO’s)  that  track  and  collect  data  on  country-level  strategies  for  reducing 
emissions do not consistently keep or collect data on the use of carbon taxes. 
Thus,  for  example, the  European  Renewable  Energy  Council  (EREC) lists a 
considerable amount of information on its website about the national policies 
pursued by individual EU Member states.
94 However, this information is for the 
most part less explicitly focused on the use of carbo n taxes (or tax exemption 
strategies) than it is on the full range of other national-level strategies. However, 
EREC ultimately does a more consistent job of addressing carbon taxes than 
some of the other publicly available resources.
95  None of these resour ces, 
however, include an independent section comparing and discussing how carbon 
taxes are put to use across the EU 27 or provide tables with comparative data on 
carbon tax level or tax exemption amounts. 
What is less clearly recognized in a broad range of  studies is the relative 
advantage carbon taxes have offered to some countries. In particular, countries 
like Sweden and Finland have employed carbon taxes (or tax exemptions for the 
consumption  of  renewable  fuels)  to  great  effect,  using  them  as  a  tool  to 
progressively  move  individuals  away  from  fuel  oil  and  toward  more  carbon 
neutral energy sources such as heat from primarily small scale combined heat 
and power bio-energy plants and increasingly geothermal heat pumps as well. 
Though countries like Finland and Sweden, in particular, have made only limited 
progress in the adoption of renewable energy technologies like wind or solar 
power, in population-weighted terms they are at the top of the scale regarding 
the adoption of renewable energy technologies and the use of biomass resources 
in both energy production and consumption.  
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The introduction of a carbon tax could significantly help re-distribute the 
burden of reducing emissions across a much broader segment of industry and 
society. If we accept the analysis that most of the emphasis of the EU climate 
strategy is placed on the emission trading scheme (ETS), then it behooves us to 
find strategies for redistributing this burden more evenly, especially when many 
of the strategies for reducing energy use and thereby reducing emissions are also 
among  the  most  cost-efficient.  Building-related  energy  use  contributes 
approximately 40% to global emissions. Further, natural gas use, despite the fact 
that  it  is  approximately  60%  as  carbon-intensive  as  coal,  is  only  marginally 
influenced  by  the  EU  ETS  and  its  use  gives  rise  to  significant  energy 
dependencies—especially  in  countries  who  are  large  importers  of  Russian 
natural gas. In this context, a strategy that has only a relatively weak impact on 
natural gas use makes little sense. Strategies could and presumably should be 
devised to promote both reduced natural gas use as well as reduced electricity 
use. 
A carbon tax is meaningful in particular because of its potential broad 
application across a wider range and broader use of carbon-based fuels. Such a 
policy strategy could ultimately even the burden of pursuing carbon-reducing 
strategies by spreading them more broadly across the full range of carbon-based 
fuel uses and by targeting a much broader segment of industry and also building-
related energy use (commercial, public, residential). Households in particular 
face few changing incentives to reduce overall energy use and, in particular, 
natural gas use under the current EU strategy.
96 Yet with a carbon tax imposed 
on all fossil fuels based on their carbon content, price signals could be more 
effectively used as an incentive to discourage fossil fuel use and thus favor 
carbon-reducing strategies on a broader scale. 
Carbon taxes are deservedly controversial as a strategy. T his is true for 
several reasons, not the least of which is the political problems associated with 
their  introduction,  nor  the  neo -liberal  position  that  government  already 
intervenes too frequently in the lives of individuals without promoting adequate 
added value. In the EU, the introduction of an EU-based taxation framework has 
likewise proven difficult due to MS resistance.  
Perhaps the most important reason why carbon taxes are controversial, 
however, is perhaps the least frequently mentioned. The justification for carbon 
taxes is usually explained in terms of an overly simplistic behavioural paradigm: 
a simple change in price is assumed to => (lead to) behaviour modification. The 
conventional logic argues that if prices are raised via the means of a tax on 
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fossil  fuels,  consumers  will  immediately  alter  their  behaviour  and  stop 
consuming fossil fuels. The real world however is never so simple. For one, most 
energy prices (electricity, engine fuels, natural gas and even coal) are more and 
more erratic. Other factors such as world demand, economic crises and relative 
supply (OPEC or peak oil) have equally or significantly larger price impacts. 
The ability of the average individual to sift through multiple factors and single 
out  the  relative  impact  of  carbon  taxes  from  among  many  potentially  larger 
causes of price fluctuations is limited. And frequently carbon taxes, if present, 
exercise only a marginal influence on relative prices.  
The second most neglected problem is inelastic demand. Thus even when 
prices rise as a result of carbon taxes, consumers may not change their behaviour 
due to the lack of reasonable alternatives. A classic example is the imposition of 
fuel taxes in an attempt to motivate consumers to drive cars less frequently, find 
alternative  means  of  transportation  or  purchase  more  fuel-efficient  vehicles. 
Unless alternatives are available, many or even most consumers will not alter 
their behaviour but will simply absorb the higher prices. Moreover, the rate of 
change  in  fuel  efficiency  over  the  years  has  been  quite  small.  The  average 
automobile  consumer  faces  a  complex  set  of  variables  (size,  functionality, 
convenience,  comfort,  etc.).  Fuel  efficiency  of  course  is  only  one  of  many 
variables driving consumer decisions. And many individuals likewise frequently 
have few alternatives to the daily commute.  
The point is that unless meaningful alternatives or complementary carbon 
neutral  alternatives  (or  products)  are  available,  consumers  are  not  likely  to 
significantly alter their consumption habits and carbon taxes will not have any 
meaningful impact on behaviour. Energy price increases going into the 2008 
economic recession and the economic crisis itself have done far more to change 
both  consumer  behaviour  as  well  as  to  provide  adequate  incentives  for  car 
producers  to  change  the  range  of  vehicles  and  technologies  they  offer  to 
consumers. Of course significant changes in price—whether driven by taxes or 
some  other  phenomenon  such  as  increasing  scarcity—are  likely  to  have  a 
significant impact on consumer behavior. But significant price increases initiated 
by carbon taxes are politically quite difficult to introduce and politicians face 
diminishing incentives to impose taxes the greater the required change in price. 
On the other hand, there are at least two very meaningful justifications for 
carbon taxes. First, carbon taxes can easily be imposed on a wide variety of 
fossil  fuels  and  thus  potentially  impact  a  far  broader  range  of  consumption 
patterns than, for example, the EU’s ETS. In this sense, carbon taxes can be both 
more evenly distributed across a broad range of consumers, thus sharing the 
burden more equally, and they can more effectively and meaningfully target a 
wider range of fossil fuels. This last point is particularly important with regard to 
the Achilles’ heel in the EU’s Energy and Climate Strategy, natural gas. Though 
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represents some 40% of EU emissions, the EU policy structure only weakly 
targets this element, if at all. 
Second, carbon taxes can be used in the same way the current EU ETS 
system is used. Carbon taxes can essentially impose a carbon price on fossil fuel 
consumption and thus affect relative price differentials between goods that are 
dependent on fossil fuels for their production and those that are carbon neutral. 
The advantage of this model, however, is its ability to target consumer behavior 
over targeting and directly penalizing individual firms. And in important ways, a 
carbon tax is a much simpler and far more bureaucratically streamlined tool for 
achieving the same goal across a much broader range of sectors and fossil fuels. 
However,  as  suggested  above,  two  additional  features  seem  to  be 
important with regard to the potential success of carbon tax strategies. The first 
of  these  is  the  presence  of  complementary  alternatives.  Without  significant 
changes  in  fuel  efficiency  and  thus  the  availability  of  real  alternatives, 
individuals  are  likely  to  make  their  consumption  choices  based  on  other 
variables. Second, given the occasionally high cost of initial investments (e.g. re-
insulating a building or installing a new geothermal heat pump), and/or the low 
impact of increased efficiency on consumer budgets (savings of $10-20/month 
on energy bills may not be persuasive enough to drive significant changes in 
consumer behaviour), the imposition of a carbon tax alone may not be adequate 
to  motivate  significant  behavioural  changes.  In  this  regard,  additional 
complementary  government-driven  strategies  (rebates,  additional  tax 
exemptions, one-time offers, etc.) are presumably a requirement. 
 
4.3. Linking mechanisms 
The trading of carbon credits is for the most part restricted to the power 
sector and high-emitting firms, i.e. to the EU ETS system. As such, powerful 
incentives to encourage emission-reducing activities are unevenly applied across 
different emission sources. Moreover, the cost of making emission reductions in 
individual compartments or sectors of national economies varies considerably 
both from sector to sector and from country to country. Though reductions in 
building-related energy use are thought to be the most cost-effective, the EU 
strategy for the non-ETS sector only promotes a small amount of effort, and that 
primarily in countries that presumably have the least to gain (i.e. have already 
made the greatest progress in energy efficiency relative to other EU Member 
states).  
Many have attempted to place an increased emphasis on energy efficiency 
goals.  The  3C  initiative  in  particular  points  to  the  high  potential  return 
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related energy use.
97 Tindale from the Centre for European Reform argues that 
energy efficiency represents “the most pain-free way for European governments 
to fight climate change”.
98 The European Environment Agency likewise suggests 
that energy efficiency efforts should be strengthened. Only a very small share of 
current emission reductions can be attributed to sectors outside the EU ETS and 
thus  to  energy  efficiency  (EEA,  2010,  p.9).  And  the  European  Climate 
Foundation  (2010)  recently  published  a  report  detailing  the  need  for  more 
concerted energy efficiency efforts, noting that the EU MS would need to triple 
their efforts in order to reach 2020 climate goals for reducing energy use by 
20%. 
Despite  the  great  potential  for  efforts  related  to  increasing  energy 
efficiency, policy efforts have to-date typically not succeeded in achieving their 
goal. Certainly one reason for this is the fact that no binding targets have so far 
been set on energy efficiency (Altmann et al., 2010b). The EU strategy so far 
only provides guidelines for relevant energy efficiency efforts. Thus, to-date, at 
least three separate tools for promoting significant advances in energy efficiency 
have not been adequately explored. The first of these—binding targets—could 
potentially  go  a  long  way  to  encouraging  MS  to  get  serious  about  energy 
savings.  Though  several  attempts  have  already  been  made  to  make  gains  in 
energy efficiency binding on MS, these have so far failed. As suggested above, 
the second, a carbon tax, could likewise have a significant impact on a broad 
segment of energy users and could be applied to a broad range of fuel types (not 
only those that are electricity generation related, but also to natural gas and/or 
fuels). Attempts to pass a carbon tax at the EU level have likewise failed. 
The  third  and  potentially  the  most  effective  tool,  however,  for  raising 
energy  efficiency—making  it  possible  to  trade  improvements  in  energy 
efficiency  in  carbon  trading  schemes—has  been  less  widely  explored.  The 
reasons for this are at best obscure. Some certainly fear that including too many 
options into an emission-trading scheme is likely to reduce carbon prices and 
thus weaken the effectiveness of the system and strategy. Such argumentation, 
for  example,  is  frequently  used  to  restrict  the  augmentation  of  the  EU  ETS 
system to other sectors such as the non-ETS sector or to land use, land use 
change and forestry, LULUCF. In this regard, insistence on maintaining high 
carbon  prices in  the  EU  ETS  may  represent  one  of  the  principal  barriers  to 
creating more flexibility in the EU climate strategy. 
Such  concerns  however  seem  misplaced.  To-date,  carbon  prices  have 
played  perhaps  the  weakest  role  in  moving  emission  reductions  forward.  As 
suggested  by  the  data presented  above,  national level  strategies  for reducing 
emissions—and in particular for encouraging the rapid adoption of renewable 
                                                 
97    The  work  of  the  3C  Initiative  is  based  on  3C  (2009)  and  the  previous  work  of 
affiliated organizations McKinsey (2008) and Vattenfall (2006). 
98 See “The EU Should be Much Bolder on Energy Efficiency” (CER, Oct. 12
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energy technologies—have ultimately been far more successful. These, what one 
might  call  “positivist”,  approaches  may  ultimately  provide  a  more  solid 
groundwork for rapid progress than the EU ETS system and its imposition of 
carbon prices.  
At the same time, creating more linkages across the multiple Kyoto (KP) 
and  in  particular  EU  trading  mechanisms  would  appear  to  represent  an 
invaluable strategy for propelling movement forward based on the principles of 
cost-efficiency and the ease of achieving emission reduction goals. Much of the 
potential field for achieving emission reductions is currently poorly mobilized in 
the EU framework. This could, presumably, be dramatically improved. 
In important respects, the degree of inflexibility in the EU carbon trading 
and emission reduction scheme(s) is frequently underestimated. This inflexibility 
however is evident at many levels. For one, emission reductions and/or avoided 
emissions  promoted  across  the  different  elements  of  the  EU  climate  policy 
structure  are  not tradable across the same  space. Thus,  for example, even  if 
individual  countries  manage  to  meet their Kyoto targets specified  in  the  EU 
burden-sharing agreement, they can still remain behind on targets related to the 
introduction of renewable energy or emission reductions in the non-ETS sector. 
Without  flexibility  across  the  system,  EU  Member  states  remain  subject  to 
multiple targets, not all of which can easily be met.  
In a similar fashion, some Member states will be forced to pursue costly 
emission reductions in the EU ETS sector, while neglecting emission reductions 
that can frequently lead to positive returns in the non-ETS sector (in particular 
with regard to building-related energy use). This particular problem is perhaps 
most  pronounced  in  countries  with  more  limited  resources  to  invest  in  new 
production technologies. While the NMS have great potential to reduce GHG 
emissions  from  building-related  energy  use—in  particular  due  to  years  of 
subsidized  energy  prices  and  far  more  limited  use  of  energy  efficiency 
technologies—the EU policy package, and in particular the EU ETS system, 
forces them to invest the larger share of their resources in one place.  
Likewise, the EU climate policy framework continues to restrict countries 
from  taking  advantage  of  the  opportunities  afforded  by  increased  efforts  at 
supporting European forest growth. This last restriction on individual Member 
states efforts is particularly difficult to understand, in particular in the context of 
the advantages forests can provide on both the climate change mitigation and 
adaptation  fronts  (see  e.g.  Ellison  et  al.,  2011).    Despite  these  potential 
advantages,  EU  climate  policy  still  prohibits  trade  in  emission  reductions 
produced in the LULUCF sector.  
A more flexible EU climate policy framework should permit the complete 
fungibility of avoided and reduced emission credits across all potential segments 
or sectors of the climate change mitigation framework. Only in this way can 
emission reductions be achieved at the lowest possible cost and with the highest 
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emission  reductions  would  significantly  help  to  encourage  rapid  emission 
reductions and the rapid promotion of renewable energy technologies.  
 
5. Discussion 
These findings cast doubt on the effectiveness of EU tools for achieving 
grand scale emission reductions over long periods of time. The EU commitment 
strategy and the EU ETS do not appear to be the most effective strategies for 
promoting  emission  reductions  and  technological  change.  At  least  one  NGO 
predicts the EU ETS will deliver only a 0.3% reduction in emissions (Sandbag, 
2010) compared to the total 8% reduction to which the EU has committed for 
2012. This is a very small contribution for an institutional and administrative 
structure that requires a considerable measurement, monitoring and certificate 
trading bureaucracy. Moreover, the quite massive financial sums redistributed 
through  the  ETS  trading  mechanism  –  annually  approx.  30-35  billion  € 
(Zachmann, 2011: p.2) – suggest the “expense” may far outweigh the usefulness 
of the strategy. To be fair, the EU ETS system is not likely to begin to have a 
real impact on emissions until the beginning of Phase 3 in 2013. Only after this 
date  will  the  transition  from  grandfathering  to  the  required  auctioning  of 
emission credits begin to give the EU ETS real teeth. 
In  contrast,  the  adoption  of  renewable  energy  technologies  in  the 
individual EU Member states has already played a decisive role in the avoidance 
of GHG emissions. Depending on how “avoided” emissions are calculated (the 
baseline  can  be  considered  against  coal-based  energy  production,  any  of  the 
other fossil fuels (brown coal, oil, natural gas), or an average across all of these. 
Thus avoided emissions vary significantly depending on which of these fossil 
fuels  is  chosen  as  the  baseline.  Thus,  for  the  EU  27  and  depending  on  the 
baseline fossil fuel type, avoided emissions represent anywhere from 8-14% of 
total 2008 GHG emissions (natural gas use and coal provide the lowest and the 
highest estimates, respectively). An average across all of the fossil fuel types 
listed above yields an estimate of approximately 11% avoided emissions in the 
EU 27. Moreover, it is important to note that the relative share of renewable 
resources in EU27 energy generation has been growing steadily between 1990 
and the present.  
Conventional predictions have repeatedly suggested the adoption of RES 
technologies  would  be  slow  and  painful.  Most  of  the  large  organizations 
conventionally  engaged  in  predicting  future  energy  generation  needs  and 
technologies (the IEA, Capgemini and the European Commission) have argued 
the predominant share of energy will be fossil fuel-based for many  years to 
come.  Capgemini  (2007),  the  European  Commission  (2007)  and  the 
International Energy Agency (IEA, 2007b, Ch.1) have all suggested the role of 
fossil fuels will make up some 80% of new capacity through 2020 or 2030. Early 
in fall 2010, however, the European Commission was compelled to recognize 
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predicted progress. With the reportedly quiet publication of its Energy Trends 
update for 2009, the Commission finally acknowledged a significant shift toward 
renewable  energy  sources  was  underway.
99  This  recognition  is  especially 
important, since it may open a pathway for the adoption of an improved strategy. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Without the introduction of reformed strategies at the more centralized EU 
level, current EU policy is likely to lead to important imbalances and distortions 
across the EU Member state economies. Though the EU as a whole has good 
chances of meeting and keeping its KP commitments, this is not necessarily the 
result of the good performance of the older EU15 Member states that initially 
signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, but is instead primarily the result of the 
performance of the Central and East European New Member states. Moreover, 
not only have these countries radically reduced emissions, they have also made 
significant progress—in particular based on their relative EU income—in the 
adoption  of  renewable  energy  technologies.  The  NMS  are  not  alone  in  this 
regard,  a  select  number  of  Western  EU  Member  states  have  also  made 
significant progress, both with emission reductions as well as with the rapid 
adoption of renewable energy technologies. However, this performance is at best 
uneven and could (some might say “must”) be significantly improved. 
Reform of the EU climate strategy is important for several reasons. First, 
much could be done to spread the positive performance of the NMS’s and the 
select  group  of  Western  states  more  evenly  across  the  wider  range  of  EU 
Member states. Failure to transfer more successful policy tools to the EU level 
means that a select group of more successful countries are over-subsidizing both 
the adoption of and innovation in RES technologies in the EU. Such market 
distorting outcomes are neither in the EU’s interest, nor in that of the subsidizing 
countries.  
A  EU-wide  strategy  could  achieve  several  important  goals  at  once.  It 
could: accelerate the rate of emission reductions and RES technology adoption, 
accelerate the rate of innovation and create a more level playing field across EU 
Member states in terms of the adoption and spread of RES technologies. Finally, 
the adoption of an EU-wide carbon tax would help re-distribute the emission 
reduction burden across a far broader segment of the economy as well as across 
different fossil fuel types, thereby reducing the potential economic distortions 
likely to arise from uneven performance. This would further have the benefit of 
including and incorporating a significantly broader range of Western MS states 
into the Kyoto mission. 
Second,  significant  reform  could  help  spread  the  adoption  of  a  wide 
variety  of  renewable  energy  technologies  across  a  broader  set  of  countries. 
                                                 
99  See  in  particular;  “64%  of  new  power  to  be  renewable  over  next  decade”, 
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Currently there is a relatively clear trend toward supporting the adoption of the 
cheaper RES technologies in the NMS. This trend cannot be easily explained on 
the basis of national comparative advantage in specific technologies and appears 
to be the direct outcome of a mix of both national level strategies and relative 
income. This trend could be reversed with a RES technology promotion strategy 
such as an EU-wide FIT that is firmly supported at the EU rather than only at the 
national level.  
Third, significant reform of the EU climate strategy could help lock in the 
successful performance demonstrated by a broad range of countries. Renewed 
economic growth, though slow to materialize, will pose a significant threat to the 
quite significant emission reductions that have already been achieved across the 
EU as a whole.  
The structure and shape of national level policy instruments in particular 
go  a  long  way  to  explaining  the  successful  comparative  performance  of  a 
number of individual EU countries. These successful strategies—and EU-wide 
FIT system and broadly based Carbon Taxes—along with the introduction of a 
more broadly based trading mechanism that allows for the complete flexibility 
and fungibility of carbon reduction efforts are likely to significantly propel the 
further reduction of EU emissions along a desirable path. 
The current author does not wish to downplay the role of international 
commitments and target-setting, nor the quite significant role the EU has played 
in these negotiations. In the context of the rapidly increasing threats posed by 
global warming and climate change, these efforts are increasingly important. At 
the  same  time  however,  the  commitment  strategy  is  not  able  to  explain  the 
relative success in emission reductions across the individual EU Member states. 
Rather, the success of individual Member state policy packages and perhaps 
individual  Member  state  commitment  to  emission  reductions  appear  to  do  a 
much better job of explaining relative progress on the Kyoto goals.  
Finally, it may be meaningful to consider that efforts to negotiate a Kyoto-
II style agreement in future Conference of the Party meetings will fail. In this 
context,  the  fact  that  the  policy  framework  proposed  herein  does  not  really 
depend on a commitment style framework may be an advantage. The policy 
framework  proposed  herein  suggests  that  countries  can  make  considerable 
progress  toward  emission  reductions  without  a  Kyoto  style  commitment 
framework. This does not mean the loss of the Kyoto framework would not have 
significant negative consequences for the global project of reducing emissions. 
Nor  does  it  mean  the  climate  policy  framework  proposed  herein  could  be 
seamlessly  integrated  into  the  EU  policy  framework.  Difficult  negotiations 
across EU Member states would still be required. But progress is in some senses 
less dependent on a commitment style framework than is frequently believed. 
The EU can clearly learn from this success and improve upon the overall 
climate policy package. Elevating the successful elements of individual Member 
state policy to the EU level and increasing the degree of flexibility across the 160   David ELLISON 
 
different components of the EU climate strategy could help to achieve the goal 
of reducing GHG emissions and mitigating the climate challenge. 
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ANNEX  
Figures 3 - 8. Share of renewable energy resource adoption by 
technology and country (weighted by population and income) 
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